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Abstract 
Wage discrimination has been widely investigated so that I try to contribute to this 
strand of the literature showing if there is evidence to exist in Italy for the period from 
2000 to 2012 by using panel data from SHIW. Moreover, I focus the investigation on 
the informal labour market but I also do on the formal one. To get this, I perform 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition model. The main goal of these estimates is observing 
whether the results change when I include a variable to control non-random selection 
processes. In accordance with this, I obtain that gender wage gap is larger among formal 
workers when I control for this correction term than when I do not control for it and 
smaller among informal workers. Finally, I perform a robustness check to observe how 
this discrimination affects in each part of the informal workers distribution. 
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1. Introduction and literature review 
Shadow economy plays a role in the GDP of all the countries of the world although the 
size of this is different for each other. Recent estimates indicate that the undeclared 
sector represents a lower value for developed countries than for developing countries. In 
particular, Enste (2015) finds that german and italian shadow economies indicate 14.6% 
and 22.5% of GDP in the period 2003-2013, respectively meanwhile for countries such 
as Panama or Bolivia Schneider (2007) shows that it becomes almost 70% of GDP.  
About the shadow economy behaviour, there is strong evidence to state that the size of 
it is counter-cyclical, that is, the size of the shadow economy as a ratio of GDP is bigger 
in bad bussiness cycles and is reduced in good ones (Elgin, 2012).  
Regarding selections processes, there is evidence that the individuals follow non-
random selection into jobs, meaning that formal workers are systematically different 
from informal workers in a way that affect their wages even after controlling for 
observable characteristics. Looking at European countries and the United States, 
Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) point out that non-random selection explains why gender 
employment gaps are negatively correlated with gender wage gaps accross countries. 
Since I consider that there is three possible statuses: unemployed, formal worker and 
informal one, I follow the Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand (2004) method by 
adding a correction term with I control for the non-random selection processes of 
staying either in a status or in another. According to the related literature, some 
investigators consider just two statuses and they follow the methodology proposed by 
Heckman (1973) (Tansel, 2001; Deininger et al., 2013) to control for selection. 
In order to perform a study about this topic we need reliable data but this is not always 
possible because people who are interviewed could think that they have been 
investigated and they may not tell the truth in their answers. However, in the last years 
there have been some advances in this field by performing randomized experiments 
(Kleven et al., 2011) or by trying to solve the selection problem (Di Porto, 2011; Di 
Porto et al., 2013). 
Regarding Italian shadow economy its size is around 22.5% of GDP as I mentioned 
above and is a country where there have been established some policies against it. An 
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example of these may be the Biagi reform with a focus on the objectives of the 
European Employment Strategy. 
This reform was enacted by Legislative Decree No. 276/2003 and it aimed to raise 
employment levels, promote labour market access for disadvantaged groups and 
increase the number of workers in stable employment. It led to an increase in the level 
of this last goal but a proper assessment will only be posible in a longer time frame 
(Tiraboschi, 2005).  
In this sense, Di Porto and Elia, 2013 use an identification strategy based on three 
amnesty laws and they suggest that all of them changed the shape of the undeclared 
sector in Italy causing a rapid emergence from this sector to the formal one. According 
to this statement, (Di Porto et al., 2013) performed an investigation to check if this 
effect was caused by these laws and they do not find a clear result.  
A possible problem related with the ineffectivenss of labour policies is that there is 
evidence to state that there is no connection between formal and informal sectors what 
supports the failure to transform black employment into regular one over the last twenty 
years (Bovi, 2005). 
Moreover, some investigators study the effect of the size of the undeclared sector on 
other labour market outcomes such as financial development (Capasso Jappelli, 2013) 
and they obtain that the local financial development is associated with a smaller size of 
the underground economy. 
Focusing on how the undeclared sector structure is related with the level of education of 
workers, Cappariello and Zizza in 2010 conclude that the probability to end up working 
in this sector is higher for those who have performed fewer years of education. These 
results are based on the same data we use but for different years and they also suggest 
that the wages are slightly higher for individuals who performed the compulsory 
education with respect to those who did not in the informal sector. 
If we refer to Italy’s economy is worth mentioning the role of immigrants because it is a 
country characterized by receiving people from abroad in last recent decades. Moreover, 
this immigration has been chaotic because most of them are from individuals who run 
away from their origin countries. 
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Therefore, how they are integrated in the labour market is interesting and, in this sense, 
there is evidence to their jobs are full of irregular components, but difficult to divide 
from the functioning of the official economy and the host society (Ambrosini, 2001). 
 
This paper is related to the literature on the dualistic view of the labour market and 
according to this view, the informal labour market is characterized by lower wages so 
that this paper presents some evidence to explain that the formal gender wage gap 
differs from the informal one. 
Therefore, if we look at the female labour market history, we may observe that they 
have been rejected for several reasons until some decades ago, when they were able to 
enter the labour market after several fights. Despite having the possibility to get a job, 
there has always been evidence of wage discrimination as Hegewisch and Williams 
(2010) suggest. 
In the last years governments from many countries have performed policies to reduce 
the discrimination although it is still persistent and pronounced between male and 
female in all the parts of the world (Hirsch, 2016). 
In spite of this Oostendorp, R., 2009 studied the relationship between the economic 
development and the occupational gender wage gap in richer countries and he suggests 
that the gap tends to decrease with increasing economic development in these countries. 
We may think that this discrimination is provoked by the different education level 
achieved by individuals because it is likely that women have not the same opportunities 
to study than men. However, Livanos and Núñez (2012) study the effect of the 
education level on the unexplained part of the wage gap, which is often related to 
discrimination, and they find that it is lower for graduates in Greece and UK. 
In addition, Arhsad and Ghani (2015) also studied whether there exists the gap for the 
same education level and they suggest that in Malaysia male wages are much higher 
than female ones within each education group. 
For Spain, de la Rica et al. (2008) also find that the gender wage gap is high and 
increases with the wage among highly educated workers while it is lower and decreases 
with wage among less educated workers. 
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We may also think that a way to reduce the gap is applying policies with the aim to 
increase the occupational integration because there is evidence that occupational 
segregation is strongly correlated with gender earnings inequality, as suggest Cotter and 
DeFiore, 1997. 
If we look at Italy, Mussida and Picchio, 2014 used data for the last two decades and 
they find that the unconditional gender wage gap remained roughly constant over time, 
however, they also suggest that the component of the gap due to different rewards of 
similar characteristics deteriorated women’s relative wage. 
Moreover, these authors, by using microdata from Italy for the formal labour market, 
found that those women who had a lower education level are really penalized in their 
salaries (Mussida and Picchio, 2012). 
Finally, focusing on papers which investigate gender wage gap in the undeclared sector 
we just find (Yahmed, 2016) where it is used data from Brazil and she finds that gender 
wage gap is higher in the informal labour market than in the formal one but she also 
argues that this may be provoked by the selection processes which determines why 
individuals choose either a sector or another. This is why she controls for endogenous 
selection into both sectors and we will try to do the same.  
The remainder part is organized as follows. The Section 2 explains what data I use to 
estimate the model and how I obtained it and the Section 3 is about the empirical 
strategy I follow where I explain with detail why I perform each step. The next section 
shows the descriptive statistics and the fifth one presents the main results of the model. 
The last two sections are added to show some robustness checks and the conclusions. 
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2. Data collection 
To perform the empirical analysis I use individual data from the Bank of Italy – Survey 
on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). This dataset shows a highly detailed 
information from different perspectives by using some multipurpose surveys where we 
may observe distributional information and evidence on correlations such as family 
composition with economic behaviour. This is really important because it allows us to 
observe the effect through different subpopulations and to establish causality from a 
policy. The survey is carried out every two years and to the scope of this paper I 
consider the period 2000-2012. The target population includes individuals aged from 15 
to 65 and amounts to 96299 observations. I restrict the sample to this range because 
these are the legal years to work according to italian laws. It also provides information 
on demographic characteristics, household composition, specifications related to the 
job, and standard labour market outcomes. To identify the experience of the individuals 
I consider the potential experience variable presented by substracting the age the 
individual is at contemporary moment and the age when he/she started to work. This 
way to calculate the potential experience presents some problems because it does not 
take into account those periods when the individual is not active in the labour market 
such as when he/she is unemployed. Regarding earnings, I compute them as the ratio 
between nominal earnings and the inflation rate using monthly values, because using 
salaries per hour may present some problems as I have to assume the number of weeks 
individuals work per month. I calculate wages this way to be able to compare them for 
all workers. Taking into account all of this, the definition I use to identify informal 
workers is considering those who have positive wages without receiving paid social 
security contributions throughout his working career. The latter information is obtained, 
as some investigators who use this survey (Di Porto Elia, 2013; Cappariello Zizza, 
2010), with the following question: Considering the employment history of. . . (name), 
did he/she ever pay, or his/her employer pay, the social security contributions even for 
a short period? so that, if the individual gives a negative reply, along with a positive 
wage, there is evidence that he/she worked in the informal labour market (Di Porto, 
2015). In addition, I generate another definition of informal worker by calculating a 
ratio between the same question I use above and the potential experience, although I just 
use this as robustness check. However, this definition may present some misreporting 
values since individuals may not say the truth about the earnings for fear of being 
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detected by the authorities, although I can exclude this possibility because the survey is 
anonimous. Moreover, to avoid problems about the tax calculation to obtain the net 
wages, I should use gross ones but it is not possible because they are not available and, 
therefore, it may lead to not too accurate results. Finally, due to labour market decisions 
and observed gender wage gaps differ accross the schooling distribution, I construct a 
regional unemployment rate for different education groups in order to identify the 
impact of lower labour demand even when controlling for regional dummies.  
 
3. Estimation Strategy  
As I mentioned across all the paper I replicate the model proposed in Yahmed (2016) 
with data from Italy, this will may be useful in two ways: the first one is upon the 
results she obtains in her investigation because if I get similar ones there is evidence 
that the model may be correctly specified and the second reason is that I may be able to 
contribute into this part of literature by performing some robustness checks and 
checking if this gap also exists when it is used different proxies of informal workers and 
using different subpopulations as I do in the final section of the paper.  
In order to estimate the gender wage gap in the informal labor market and in the formal 
one I explain in this section the model I use where I first estimate the raw and adjusted 
wages by controlling for observable characteristics and then, I also control for selection 
into the different labour statuses. 
 
3.1  The raw and adjusted wage gaps 
This section shows some simple ways to obtain gender wage gap only controlling for 
observable characteristics. To do this I present how to calculate the raw wage gap and 
the adjusted wage one. 
The first simple idea we could perform to obtain the raw wage gap in the different 
sectors from a simple equation:  
ln⁡(𝑤𝑖𝑗) = 𝛽0 + 𝛼𝑗 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗   (1) 
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where the dependent variable is the log wage  and F is a dummy equal to one when 
indicates if the employee i is a woman and the sub-index j shows the sector where the 
individual belongs. 
In this equation, I am interested in the coefficient we obtain (𝛼𝑗) because it indicates the 
wage difference between male and female individuals1. However, this equation may 
present some important problems. One of them is that it is quite likely to obtain biased 
estimations due to the zero conditional mean assumption could not hold because I am 
not controlling for any individual characteristics. 
On the other hand, to estimate the adjusted wage gap I use a version of wage gap 
decomposition model developed by Oaxaca (1976) and Blinder (1973) which separates 
the gap in two parts. The first one is due to group differences in the magnitudes of the 
independent variables of the referred outcome and into the second part does it for the 
effects of these variables. 
To perform it, I estimate three equations, two separate wage equations for men and 
women and a pooled wage equation with gender dummies and an identification 
restriction such as Yahmed, 2016. 
ln⁡(𝑤𝑖𝑝𝑗) = 𝛽0𝑝𝑗 + 𝛼𝑝𝑓𝑗 ∗ 𝐹𝑖 + 𝛼𝑝𝑚𝑗 ∗ 𝑀𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖 ∗ 𝛽𝑝𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗 ⁡ (2.a) 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ln⁡(𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑗) = 𝛽0𝑓𝑗 + 𝑋𝑖 ∗ 𝛽𝑓𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑓𝑗 ⁡(2.b) 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ln⁡(𝑤𝑖𝑚𝑗) = 𝛽0𝑚𝑗 + 𝑋𝑖 ∗ 𝛽𝑚𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑚𝑗              (2.c) 
 
where X is a set of variables to control for individual characteristics and it includes the 
number of years of education, age and its square, whether the individual was born in 
Italy, the experience and the experience square and indicators for the region where the 
person lives and for the sector of activity where he/she works. 
Since this model follows a linear form I need the zero conditional mean assumption 
because the gap may be expressed as the difference in the linear prediction at the group-
specific means of the regressors (Jann, 2008) because otherwise I would obtain biased 
results and it may be shown as  
𝐺𝐴𝑃 = 𝐸(𝑌𝐴) − 𝐸(𝑌𝐵)) = 𝐸(𝑋𝐴)
′𝛽𝐴 − 𝐸(𝑋𝐵)
′𝛽𝐵    (3) 
                                                          
1𝐸(𝑙𝑛⁡(𝑤𝑗)|𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒) − 𝐸(𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑗) |𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒) = 𝛼?̂? 
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because  
𝐸(𝑌𝑖) = 𝐸(𝑋𝑖
′𝛽𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖) = 𝐸(𝑋𝑖)
′𝛽
𝑖
+ 𝐸(𝜀𝑖) = 𝐸(𝑋𝑖)
′𝛽
𝑖
   (4) 
In other terms, the decomposition allows for selection on unobservables as long as they 
are the same for both men and women and yield identical selection biases (Yahmed, 
2016).  
Despite of this, we may assume a weaker assumption called the ignorability one which 
implies that the distribution of the error term given X is the same for the two groups but 
it also may be problematic because the reasons why women and men choose working 
either into the formal sector or into the informal one may be different so that we suggest 
to adopt a model to be able to control for this through a selection function in the case of 
having these trouble. 
 
Under the ignorability assumption, the total wage gap may be decomposed into three 
terms but we are just interested in the last two ones. These ones account for gender 
differences in the prices associated with given characteristics and it is expresses as 
 
𝑊𝐺𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = (𝑋′𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ − 𝑋′𝑓)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝛽𝑝?̂? + 𝑋′𝑓̅̅ ̅̅ (𝛽𝑝?̂? − 𝛽𝑓𝑗)̂      (5) 
where 𝛽𝑝?̂? indicates the benchmark from the pooled sample using male and female 
observations 
 
3.2  Treatment for selection into multiple employment statuses 
 
In our model the individuals may be in three different statuses because they do not 
choose only between working or not working but also they have the possibility of 
working into the undeclared sector. This probability is different accross the individuals 
so that we provide a multinomial logit model with the goal to assign the probabilities to 
be in the different statuses for individuals regarding their characteristics and processes 
they follow. To do this I consider that the outcome may take one of the three different 
statuses: unemployed, employed in the formal labour market and employed in the 
informal labour market. 
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As I mentioned in the previous section the model I present controls for a selection 
equation which indicates the status in which the individual is conditional on the utility 
when it takes some values such as follows:  
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑗⁡𝑖𝑓⁡𝑉𝑖𝑗⁡ > max
𝑘≠𝑗
(𝑉𝑖𝑘)   (5) 
 
In other words, I observe the status j for the individual i when its utility is the highest 
with respect to the other utilities. 
 
Regarding assumptions I have to assume that the utility associated with each status is 
linear and their errors are independent and identically distributed (iid) so that I may 
estimate the probability of being in status j for individual i by using the multinomial 
logit model (McFadden, 1973). 
 
  𝑃𝑖𝑗 = Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑗) =
exp⁡(𝑋𝑖⁡𝜆𝑖+𝑍𝑖𝛼𝑖)
∑ exp⁡(𝑛𝑗 𝑍𝑖𝛼𝑗)
  (6) 
 
 
The full model I follow is 
 
ln(𝑤𝑖𝑗) = 𝑋1𝑖𝑗𝛽1𝑗 + 𝑋2𝑖𝑗𝛽2𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗 , 𝑖𝑓⁡⁡𝑉𝑖𝑗⁡ > max
𝑘≠𝑗
(𝑉𝑖𝑘) ⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑗 = 2,3  (7) 
 
𝑉𝑖𝑗 = 𝑋1𝑖⁡𝜆𝑗+𝑍𝑖𝛼𝑗+𝜇𝑖𝑗, 𝑗 = 1,…⁡, 3      (8) 
  
In this case the biased estimations are just obtained when both errors are correlated, in 
other words, when the unobserved characteristics from the selection process to be either 
in a status or in other one is correlated with the unobserved factors which affect to the 
individual’s wage. 
In the main equation (7), the independent variables represent variables which influence 
the wage in status j, in particular  includes productive characteristics of the individual i 
such as the number of years of education achieved, his/her age and its square, whether 
the individual is italian, whether he/she lives in an urban area and to control for the 
status of the labour market among regions we add regional dummies and the 
unemployment rate sorted by education level and region what allows us to identify the 
impact of lower labour demand even when and regional dummies. On the other hand, 
the set of variables named includes some specifications that determine the wage of the 
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individual i but whose are just observable if he/she works: the time spent since the 
individal started to work (experience) and the experience squared and to control for the 
sector where the employee works I add indicators for the sectors of activity. 
With respect to the selection equation (8), includes variables which determine the wage 
and influence the work status and is a set of characteristics that do not affect wages but 
are relevant to the work status identification such as the percentage of the individuals in 
the family who works and receives a salary or whether the individual is head of 
household. 
Finally, to control for the selection process to stay either in a status or in another we 
adopt a particular term which is the following function h(𝑃1, . . , 𝑃3)⁡and it yields to the 
conditional mean of the error term. “Adopting Lee’s Model (1983) approach, we 
assume that the joint distribution of 𝑢𝑗   and a transformation of 𝜇𝑗  does not depend on 
the other 𝜇𝑘⁡for j≠ 𝑘”(Yahmed, 2016). 
In addition, I also follow Dubin and McFadden (1984) who make less restrictive 
assumptions on the correlation between 𝑢𝑗   and the (𝜇𝑘 − 𝜇𝑗). 
To consider the different points of view I estimate the correction term following the 
models proposed by Lee and Dubin and McFadden. 
After including this new term in our Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition model we obtain 
the following results: 
ln𝑊𝑚𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑓𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = (𝑋′𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ − 𝑋′𝑓)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝛽𝑝?̂?+𝑋′𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝛽𝑚?̂? − 𝛽𝑝𝑗)̂ + 𝑋′𝑓̅̅ ̅̅ (𝛽𝑝?̂? − 𝛽𝑓𝑗)̂ +
𝜃𝑚𝑗ℎ𝑚𝑗(𝑃1, . . , 𝑃3) − 𝜃𝑓𝑗ℎ𝑓𝑗(𝑃1, . . , 𝑃3)                                                                 (9) 
𝑊𝐺𝑠𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = (𝑋′𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ − 𝑋′𝑓)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝛽𝑝?̂? + 𝑋′𝑓̅̅ ̅̅ (𝛽𝑝?̂? − 𝛽𝑓𝑗)̂                                                         (10) 
 
The first equation shows the total decomposition when the additional term is added to 
the model and it captures the average in difference selection bias. In addition, the 
interpretation of this term has been treated on different ways in the literature of wage 
decompositions but I follow Yun (2007) who advocates treating selection as a separate 
term. Therefore, the selection term provides a measure of the difference between the 
observed wage gap and the gap in wage offers. 
 
 
14 
 
 
On the other hand, the second one presents the wage gap between male and female 
individuals and it is not equal to that showed in equation (3). The main difference with 
that one is that (10) estimate consistently the coefficients following the treatment for 
selection. 
 
3.3  Identification 
In this section I explain some exclusion restrictions needed to identify the effect of 
selection and vanish the selection bias from the wage estimates without relying on the 
functional forms. These restrictions mean that there are some variables which affect 
wages only through the status where they stay. Since I am performing a replication from 
Yahmed (2016) I try to use the same variables as long as they are available.  
Therefore, the excluded variables I chose are the following. The first one is whether the 
individual is head of household, because it may influence to stay either in a status or in 
another due to the fact his/her income is the main one.   
The second variable I use is the number of people compose the household, because I 
think that, if this value is higher, the individual will consider working in the formal 
sector to give to his/her family more security. In this sense, I also use the share of 
individuals who receives income from working. 
Finally, I consider two more variables where the first one represents the individual’s 
civil status, because there is evidence that women may be conditionated to choose the 
sector to work depending on whether they are married. The last variable I include is the 
region where the individual was born because it may represent a strong characteristic to 
be either a formal worker or an informal one. 
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4. Descriptive statistics 
In this section I show some different specifications of the individuals to defend the 
model I estimate in the final part of the paper. I present these specifications through the 
following tables and distribution graphs. 
Table 1 shows some main variables from own characteristics to job related ones. In first 
place, we may observe that in both sectors the mean of years of schooling are higher for 
women than for men, this may be explained by the fact of those women who want to 
work are high-skill workers. Moreover, these means are lower for the informal labour 
market such as Addabbo and Favaro in 2011 suggested. 
Regarding the mean of age in each sector we may observe that it is much higher for the 
formal sector than for the informal one where this value is around thirty four years. A 
plausible explanation of this may be that as people get older give preference the stability 
received from the social security. The variable which represents whether the individual 
is the head of household takes higher values for men than for women in both sectors. 
This may agree with cultural believes about it has to be the man who brings income to 
home meanwhile the woman cares about the children and the house. 
If we focus on Italian individuals we may observe that there are more ones in the formal 
labor market than in the informal ones. A job related characteristic we may looking at is 
experience average for each sector and, we may observe that the value shows a higher 
value (around 21 years) for the formal sector than for the informal one (around 12 
years). 
According to the composition of household we may observe to the number of people are 
composed and the share of household member who are working and the values they 
take are really similar for both sectors. 
Finally, I focus on the public sector because it does not have to have informal labour 
market but the question I am using may lead to mistake because it does not include 
companies in which the government is a stakeholder, such as the postal service and the 
national railways. Regarding the data we may observe that it is higher the share of 
women working in this sector than the share of men. I also present whether the 
individual works in his/her main job and we may observe that almost all the individuals 
interviewed do.  
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Table 1 
FORMAL INFORMAL
Variables Men Columna2 Women Columna1 Men Columna3 Women5 Columna4
Years of schooling 4,2041 (1,445537) 4,6466 (1,457972) 3,675 (1,39856) 4,327 (1,517042)
Age 4,1788 (1,097993) 4,1569 (1,025952) 33,632 (11,33673) 35,006 (11,54569)
Head of household 0,7626 (0,4254857) 0,3550 (0,4785411) 0,581 (0,4936601) 0,311 (0,4631467)
Italian nationality 0,5122 (0,4998626) 0,5362 (0,4987014) 0,456 (0,4983481) 0,498 (0,5004024)
Experience 2,1944 (1,179359) 20,0354 (11,12954) 13,791 (11,7172) 11,611 (11,12225)
Number of people 3,3686 (1,177708) 3,1451 (1,177455) 3,677 (1,422259) 3,364 (1,344346)
Share of household members working 0,6550 (0,2672368) 0,7522 (0,2245641) 0,621 (0,2657489) 0,746 (0,2305557)
Civil status 1,3833 (0,5748167) 1,5283 (0,7608407) 1,635 (0,534897) 1,811 (0,723365)
Public sector 0,2298 (0,4207182) 0,3425 (0,4745842) 0,109 (0,3117414) 0,157 (0,3643865)
Main job 0,9950 (0,0707806) 0,9961 (0,062127) 0,995 (0,067002) 0,982 (0,1323286)
 
Source:.Author’s calculation based on the SHIW 2000-2012, Italy. Standard deviations in 
parenthesis. Values represent the mean of each variable for each sector and gender. 
Table 2 shows the share of individuals who stay in each status and in each sector for the 
different educational levels. 
We find the biggest gender difference among workers for the lower secondary education 
level while the smallest one is in the tertiary education level among unemployed 
individuals. 
Finally, we may observe that women perform more educational years than men among 
workers and considering unemployed individuals are women who achieve less 
education levels. All this coincides with the evidence I found into the related literature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
Table 2 
All Unemployed Formal Informal
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Primary education 11.58 16.93 17.23 24.39 7.40 4.99 14.64 8.09
Lower secondary education 38.06 32.97 42.07 38.46 35.68 23.84 46.40 31.72
Upper and post secondary education 40.06 38.62 34.02 30.92 44.72 51.86 32.09 45.15
Tertiary education 10.31 11.48 6.68 6.23 12.20 19.32 6.87 15.05
Source: Author’s calculation based on the SHIW 2000-2012, Italy. It shows the share of 
individuals who stay in each status and in each sector for the different educational levels. 
 
Table 32 presents the regional unemployment rate by gender and different educational 
levels. We may observe that this rate is much higher for female individuals in all 
education groups. Despite of this, the value gets lower for the higher educational levels. 
Therefore, the biggest difference occurs in primary education level. In order to identify 
the impact of lower labour demand I include an index which represents the regional 
unemployment rate for educational levels as control variables.  
To complete the data description I present some distributions to observe how the wages 
are distributed across the sample. 
We may observe that, among formal workers, the wage distribution is really similar 
although is a little bit fatter on the left side for women. If we look at the informal sector 
we may appreciate that women wage distribution is shifted farther to the left showing us 
that there exists a distributional gender wage gap. 
Moreover, this fact occurs at all educational levels in both sectors since we may 
observe. In the next sections I show whether this gap is different between the sectors 
and whether it occurs even when controlling for some different variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Table 3 is showed in the Appendix 
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Figure 1 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the SHIW 2000-2012, Italy. It shows wage distribution 
for each sector and gender. The left-side figure represents the formal sector and the right-side 
one, the informal sector. 
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Source: Author’s calculation based on the SHIW 2000-2012, Italy. It shows wage distribution 
for each gender among formal workers by different educational level. The images are organized 
as Primary education, Lower secondary education, Upper and post secondary education and 
Tertiary education, respectively. 
Figure 3 
  
  
Source: Author’s calculation based on the SHIW 2000-2012, Italy. It shows wage distribution 
for each gender among informal workers by different educational level. The images are 
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organized as Primary education, Lower secondary education, Upper and post secondary 
education and Tertiary education, respectively. 
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5. Results 
In this section I show the estimations of the model presented in the “Estimation 
Strategy” section. 
I start the empirical analysis by commenting the multinomial logit estimates for each 
sector and gender. 
In first place, if we look at the formal labour market coefficients for men we may 
appreciate that the probability of being in this status is different for the individuals 
depending on their characteristics. This is clear because all the coefficients are 
significant at all levels.  
Moreover, all the signs make sense. For instance, we expect that if the individual is the 
head of household, the probability to work in the formal sector increases because it 
guarantees some stability. 
In second place, if we focus on the informal labour market, we may observe that we 
obtain almost the same results as in the formal sector. In this sense, it is worth 
mentioning the fact of the educational level obtained has opposite effects in both 
sectors, showing a negative effect when this level increases.  
Regarding women’s results, we may observe that in the formal labour market the 
variables included in the equation are significant and the signs are the expected.  
Comparing them with the informal estimates we may observe that the results are the 
same, even the educational level sign. 
Since I mention above, the first equation I estimate the raw gender wage gap with no 
control variables for the formal and informal sector. In this equations, the coefficient 
obtained represents the gap.  
If we look at Table 6 the coefficients of the raw gender wage gap estimation show that 
there is evidence of a negative gender wage difference for women in both sectors and it 
is significant from 1% level. Moreover, among formal workers the gender wage gap 
arises to 23.5% while among informal workers it is around 26.6%. 
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Table 4 
Formal status Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
Age 0,60117 0,0079375 75,74 0 0,5856163 0,6167308
Ages square -0,00798 0,0000956 -83,43 0 -0,0081642 -0,0077894
Level of education 0,16798 0,0103494 16,23 0 0,1476933 0,1882623
Italian 0,15770 0,0296269 5,32 0 0,0996321 0,2157675
Head of household 2,51256 0,0418568 60,03 0 2,430517 2,5945920
Number of components 0,39458 0,0159806 24,69 0 0,3632588 0,4259014
Share of household members working2,98332 0,0712471 41,87 0 2.843.675 3.122.959
Civil status -0,63015 0,0332102 -18,97 0 -0,6952397 -0,5650581
Birth municipality -0,13705 0,0175906 -7,79 0 -0,1715248 -0,1025711
_cons -1,32722 0,2101364 -63,16 0 -1.368.409 -1.286.037
Notes: Multinomial logit estimates for the formal sector based on the SHIW for 2000-2012, 
Italy. All the coefficients are statiscally significant at 0%, 5% and 10%. 
Table 5 
Informal status Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
Age 0,40892 0,0211 19,41 0 0,3676263 0,4502194
Ages square -0,00631 0,0003 -23,11 0 -0,0068475 -0,0057767
Level of education -0,10228 0,0302 -3,39 0,001 -0,1614114 -0,0431536
Italian 0,04404 0,0761 0,58 0,563 -0,1050993 0,1931708
Head of household 2,48686 0,1021 24,35 0 2,286683 2,687037
Number of components 0,48028 0,0363 13,24 0 0,4091786 0,5513811
Share of household members working 3,25094 0,1782 18,24 0 2.901.665 360.022
Civil status -0,36761 0,0945 -3,89 0 -0,5527653 -0,1824499
Birth municipality 0,83811 0,0579 14,46 0 0,7245482 0,9516813
_cons -1,38666 0,5202 -26,66 0 -1,488616 -1,284694
Notes: Multinomial logit estimates for the formal sector based on the SHIW for 2000-2012, 
Italy. All the coefficients are statiscally significant at 1%, 5% and 10% except the Italian 
nationality. This is significant just at 10% level. 
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Table 6 
ln_w_month (1) (2)
fem -0,2358756*** -0,2669935***
(0,0047615) (0,0305402)
_const 6,935064 6,541
(0,0029503) (0,0184647)  
Notes: OLS estimates. Column (1) shows the results for the formal labour market and (2) 
presents those for the informal one. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *** significant 
at 1%. Variable “fem” refers to female individuals. 
The coefficients of the raw gender estimation show that there is evidence of a negative 
gender wage difference for women in both sectors and it is significant from 1% level. 
Moreover, among formal workers the gender wage gap arises to 23.5% while among 
informal workers it is around 26.6%. 
However, this coefficient may be biased for the reasons I mentioned above.  
Table 8 shows the results obtained from following the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
model controlling for observable characteristics. From this, we may observe that wage 
gap due to differences by gender in productive characteristics among formal workers 
shows evidence that the difference should be positive for women, but the unexplained 
one becomes 26.4%. This value is even higher than the result presented in the first 
equation and it may be explained by the fact of women are positive self-selected.  
 
Regarding the informal sector, there is evidence to the total gender wage gap arises to 
32.62% and most of it is from the unexplained part. This coincides with the same 
reasoning from above so that I present the same estimates but including the correction 
term to control for non-random selection processes. If selection into a status of work is 
indeed non-random, observed wages either overstate or understate wage offers. 
 
These estimates are showed in the rows from (3) to (6). The different estimates include 
the correction term following the two approaches explained above. Moreover, the 
term’s estimates are obtained after setting a hundred of repetitions.  
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Table 7 
Coef. Robust SE z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
difference 0,2410407*** 0,0086466 27,88 0 0,2240937 0,2579877
(1) explained -0,0235972*** 0,0061078 -3,86 0 -0,0355683 -0,0116261
unexplained 0,2646379*** 0,0079006 33,5 0 0,249153 0,2801228
difference 0,3262214*** 0,0574351 5,68 0 0,2136507 0,4387921
(2) explained 0,0721032 0,0511183 1,41 0,158 -0,0280869 0,1722932
unexplained 0,2541182*** 0,0677344 3,75 0 0,1213612 0,3868753
difference 0,2257217*** 0,0089585 25,2 0 0,2081633 0,2432801
(3) explained -0,0062772 0,0066391 -0,95 0,344 -0,0192895 0,0067351
unexplained 0,2319989*** 0,0082761 28,03 0 0,215778 0,2482198
difference 0,335007*** 0,0638962 5,24 0 0,2097727 0,4602414
(4) explained 0,1161096* 0,060777 1,91 0,056 -0,0030111 0,2352303
unexplained 0,2188974*** 0,0759535 2,88 0,004 0,0700312 0,3677636
difference 0,2257217*** 0,0089585 25,2 0 0,2081633 0,2432801
(5) explained -0,0169073** 0,0065442 -2,58 0,01 -0,0297336 -0,004081
unexplained 0,242629*** 0,0082957 29,25 0 0,2263697 0,2588883
difference 0,335007*** 0,0638959 5,24 0 0,2097733 0,4602408
(6) explained 0,1200233** 0,0610742 1,97 0,049 0,00032 0,2397266
unexplained 0,2149837*** 0,076454 2,81 0,005 0,0651366 0,3648308
 
Notes: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition estimates. Panel (1) and (2) show the results controlling 
for observable characteristics for both sectors. Panel (3) and (4) present the estimation 
controlling for non-random selection following Lee’s approach. Panel (5) and (6) the same than 
(3) and (4) but following Dubin and McFadden’s model. Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. These estimates 
are based on SHIW data for 2000-2012. Control variables used are educational level, age, age 
square, potential experience, potential experience square, Italian nationality and regional 
unemployment rate. Selection equation: controlling for the same previous variables and head of 
household, number of components in the household, share of household members working, civil 
status and birth municipality. 
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As expected, among formal workers there is evidence of a decrease in the gap which 
supports the idea that women are positively selected. This leads to larger results, 
therefore, there is evidence that gender wage gap is overestimated. This may be 
explained by the fact of employers offer lower wages to women because they have a 
higher quit probability so that they expect to face higher labour costs. 
 
However, among informal workers I can appreciate that there is evidence that total gap 
is also larger than when controlling for observable characteristics. Moreover, the 
unexplained part shows a decrease in both cases. This reduction comes from the 
inclusion of the correction term which captures the non-random selection processes.  
In addition, this is related with the idea mentioned above that women are positively 
selected which means that only those who are more prepared work. Therefore, these 
results are consistently estimated and support the evidence of wage discrimination 
against women. 
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6. Robustness checks 
To complete the investigation and checking whether the results obtained are reliable I 
perform some estimations by considering another definition of informal workers. I use a 
ratio between the same variable I use in the model and the potential experience and take 
into account the percentiles of it. I apply this quantile decomposition to analyse the 
changes of the gender wage gap at different points of the wage distribution. 
 
I estimate the gender wage gap by using the Oaxaca and Blinder decomposition model 
controlling for observable characteristics as I do in the first part of the previous section.  
The table shows the results obtained and they present evidence that the gap is higher as 
workers perform a higher percentage of their worklife in the informal sector. Moreover, 
we may observe that this discrimination decreases when we look more to the right of the 
distribution. In other words, when workers have been fewer years in this sector, the gap 
is smaller. 
Finally, we may observe that the unexplained part represents most of this difference. In 
addition, this wage gap due to differences in returns for the same characteristics presents 
smaller values when the observed part of the distribution is closer to the bottom.  
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Table 8 
Coef. Robust SE z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
difference .3308049 .0863322 3.83 0.000 .1615969 .5000129
p05 explained -.106175 .059006 -1.80 0.072 -.2218246 .0094745
unexplained .43698 .0792307 5.52 0.000 .2816907 .5922693
difference .3197186 .0368393 8.68 0.000 .2475149 .3919223
p15 explained -.0611753 .0229195 -2.67 0.008 -.1060968 -.0162539
unexplained .3808939 .0355006 10.73 0.000 .311314 .4504739
difference .2959545 .0245648 12.05 0.000 .2478084 .3441006
p25 explained -.0522043 .015873 -3.29 0.001 -.0833148 -.0210938
unexplained .3481588 .0240867 14.45 0.000 .3009497 .3953679
difference .292619 .0195673 14.95 0.000 .2542677 .3309703
p35 explained -.0494643 .0130548 -3.79 0.000 -.0750514 -.0238773
unexplained .3420833 .0186921 18.30 0.000 .3054476 .3787191
difference .2679861 .0164273 16.31 0.000 .2357891 .3001831
p45 explained -.0508064 .0114458 -4.44 0.000 -.0732397 -.0283731
unexplained .3187925 .0158132 20.16 0.000 .2877992 .3497858
 
Notes: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition estimates.. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
*** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%. * significant at 10%. These estimates are based on 
SHIW data for 2000-2012. Control variables used are educational level, age, age square, 
potential experience, potential experience square, Italian nationality and regional 
unemployment rate. Selection equation: controlling for the same previous variables and head of 
household, number of components in the household, share of household members working, civil 
status and birth municipality. 
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7. Conclusions 
After presenting all the results I can conclude that there is evidence of wage 
discrimination in the formal and informal labour market during the period from 2000-
2012 in Italy. 
Despite of the existence of it, I obtain that this gap is smaller when I control for non-
random selection processes following different models proposed by Lee, Dubin and 
McFadden. As I mention above, it supports the idea of positive selection and presents 
evidence of overestimating gender wage gap when just controlling for observable 
characteristics.  
In addition, this gap is almost completely unexplained by observed characteristics, 
applying SHIW data for the mentioned period. I also provide evidence across the 
distribution and it showed the discrimination is larger among workers who spent most 
of their worklife in the undeclared sector. 
If I compare the results obtained in this paper with Yahmed’s ones I may observe that 
they are different. Yahmed (2016) present a qualitatively different gender wage gap 
from Brazil than the one I show here in formal and informal sectors (5% and 13% vs 
22.5% and 33.5%). These differences may be explained by the different laws are in each 
country and how they influence wage offers by gender. Another interesting explanation 
may come from the different development levels the countries have. 
Moreover, if I revise gender wage gap literature I find that some investigations suggest 
a smaller gap (Piazzalunga and Di Tommaso, 2015; Mussida and Picchio, 2014). 
However, when they control for non-random selection, I think that the different results 
are due to the fact of they just consider two statuses and perform the model proposed by 
Heckman (1974).  
In this sense, it would be interesting perform some estimations by using subpopulations 
to check whether the size of the discrimination. These subpopulations could be either 
immigrant individuals or classifying by civil status because some studies have found 
that female individuals have different incentives to invest in human capital. Another 
interesting idea would be considering a country where there exists the same laws for 
men and women when they have children. By using this, I think it is able to find 
whether this policy gets to reduce wage discrimination. 
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Finally, I perform the investigation by considering the monthly wages but I checked that 
there is evidence that considering hourly ones the results are qualitatively similar. 
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9. Appendix  
Table 3 
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